Abstract: This work applies various probit/logit models to a database constructed by the authors, consisting of rulings by the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional, TC) resolving positive conflicts of competence between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities from 1981 to 2014. Our goal is to contrast empirically whether the decisions of the Court respond strictly to legal criteria (the legalist or formalist viewpoint) or if they are determined by political motivations, so that we can state that the TC constitutes an extension, in the jurisdictional milieu, of the central executive power (the realist viewpoint). According to the results of our estimations, we can state that the approach which appears to predominate in the behaviour of the TC is the legalistic one.
Introduction
One of the most conflictive aspects of the design and functioning of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" is the distribution of competences between the Central Government (hereafter CG) and the Autonomous Communities (Spanish political regions, hereafter ACs). On one hand, it is claimed there is a need to finalize the process of attributing competences to the regions; on the other, the CG is criticized for interfering in regional competences. And all sides agree that the assignment of competences arising from the Constitution is confusing and unwieldy (Aja, 2014; García Roca, ed., 2014) , which in the end also affects how citizens understand and value the State of Autonomies (López Laborda and Rodrigo, 2015) .
These shortcomings have given rise to numerous conflicts between the CG and the ACs.
1 When they could not be resolved politically (or the will to do so was lacking), these conflicts were referred to the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional, hereafter the TC), the competent body according both to the Constitution and to the Organic Law 2/1979, of 3 October (hereafter the LOTC). This leads to the question underlying this research -whether the rulings of the Court respond strictly to legal criteria (the viewpoint identified in the literature as "legalist" or "formalist") or if they are determined by political motivations (a "realist" viewpoint) . In this latter case, as TC members are appointed by central institutions, one would expect this body to be predisposed to rule in favour of those institutions.
This work hopes to provide an empirical answer to this question. To keep it within manageable limits, the research focuses on "conflicts of competence" in the strict sense, and in particular, on the "positive vertical conflicts" governed by Articles 60 -67 of the LOTC, formalized before the TC when the central (autonomic) government considered that a regulation, resolution or act by an AC (the State) did not respect the order of competences established in the Constitution, the Statutes of Autonomy, and the law.
2 If the controversial competence should be attributed by a law, or a regulation with the force of law, the conflict of competences is processed as established for an action of unconstitutionality.
3 1 On the "regulatoy inflation" of the Autonomous Communities, see Marcos et al. (2010) . López-Laborda and Vallés (2010) analyze the determinants of the regulatory activity of the Autonomous Communities between 1989 and 2001 and show the relevance of some variables, such as the existence of nationalist political parties in regional governments.
2 The "negative conflict of competence" occurs when the CG (the AC) declines jurisdiction to resolve any claim, considering that the competence corresponds to an AC (to the CG or another AC): See Articles 68 -72 LOTC.
After this introduction, the second section of the paper briefly reviews the scarce available literature. Next, the third section presents the database created specifically for this research, containing all the positive conflicts of competence between the CG and the ACs resolved from 1981 to 2014. The fourth and fifth sections specify and estimate various probit/logit models based on the database mentioned above, in order to determine whether the decisions of the TC are better explained from a legal or a political perspective. Our conclusion is that we cannot dismiss the legal criteria as the best explanation of the behaviour of the TC, and so we should
give a negative answer to the question in the title of this paper: no, the Spanish Constitutional
Court does not appear to be an instrument used by Central Government against the Autonomous Communities.
Review of the literature
The literature of other countries has examined in depth all the factors (legal, but also personal, economic, ideological, etc.) which influence the behaviour, and thus the rulings, of judges and courts. The work of reference is undoubtedly Epstein, Landes and Posner (2013) . In Spain, there have been cultivators of the economic analysis of justice for a long time (e.g., Pastor, 1993; Cabrillo and Fitzpatrick, 2008; Mora-Sanguinetti, 2009 ), but the specific subject we research here has hardly been treated. The works relating most directly to ours are those by Del Castillo (1987) , Sala (2010 Sala ( , 2011 and Garoupa et al. (2013) , for Spain, and Dalla Pellegrina and Garoupa (2013),
for Italy.
The seminal work of Del Castillo (1987) offers the first evidence of the behaviour of TC judges.
The article analyses their particular opinions in relation to the rulings of the Plenary, from the creation of the Court until December 1985. Based on a descriptive approach, the results suggest the existence of two ideological voting patterns (conservative against progressive judges), allowing the author to "presume the existence of a certain regularity in the behavioural model of the two groups of judges, in terms of their opinions" (Del Castillo, 1987: 184-185 ).
The works of Sala (2010 Sala ( , 2011 study the decisions of the TC in relation to territorial disputes between the CG and the ACs, based on the classification of these disputes offered by the Ministry of Public Administrations (2008) . The earlier of these works analyses, for the period, and in descriptive terms, the success rate of the CG and the ACs in relation to the controversies in which they were involved. According to the main result of the work, in general terms, regions whose legal attitude was more belligerent were attributed a lower success rate. Sala (2011) , again starting with the exploitation of the classification of territorial disputes provided by the Ministry, and for the period 1980-2008, econometrically estimates the factors affecting the probability of the decision favouring the CG or the ACs. Based on the results obtained by Sala (2011) , if the CG is the plaintiff, its previous success rate in preceding conflicts and a lower regional sensitivity of judges increase the probability of the CG being favoured by the ruling. The author concludes that the individual preferences of the judges would emerge more strongly when the basis for the ruling cannot rest on firm precedents. Garoupa et al. (2013) , for the period 1980-2006, use econometrics to study the factors determining whether a judge votes in line with the political party that backed their nomination.
To do this, they analyse the votes of the judges in a sample of rulings created with the most outstanding cases resolving actions of unconstitutionality. According to the results, the probability of a judge voting in line with the interests of the party which appointed him increases if that party instigated the legal controversy -at the national or regional level -or the case was brought by a nationalist government. However, the authors conclude that party interests cannot fully explain judges' behaviour.
Finally, although it deals with Italy, the research closest to our work is the study by Dalla Peregrina and , who estimate econometrically, for the 1998-2009 period, variables relating to the legalist and realist perspectives, which modulate judgements in favour of the CG in conflicts of competence with the Italian regions. The authors find evidence that if the CG brings the suit or the judge presiding is in line ideologically with the party of the prime minister (and there is an ideological majority in the Court in this vein) there is a greater probability of the ruling favouring the CG.
As Bednar (2004) and Sala (2014) show, the identification of determinants which can predict to some degree the result of legal rulings contains clear incentives for modulating the strategic behaviour of agents, especially those of territorial administrations in the case of federal States.
Database. Descriptive analysis
The database consists of the 365 rulings on positive conflicts of competence between the CG and the ACs from 1981 to 2014. As Figure 1 shows, the regions present nearly three times as many conflicts as the CG. 4 Figure 2 shows many conflicts were brought by the CG at the start of the decentralisation process, but the number decreases until the early 90s. In the 80s, the ACs presented even more conflicts than the CG. They gradually decreased until 2003, when another period of conflict began. As summarized in Figure 5 , most of the rulings are favourable to the CG and to both levels of administration (i.e., a partially favourable decision). The TC rules in favour of the CG nearly twice as much as for the ACs. Also, as can be seen in Figure 6 , over time there are fewer rulings in favour of the ACs (correlation time-favourable ruling: -0.54) and more in favour of both governments (+0.33). (131) 84 (78) 123 (86) 365 (295) Source: Own elaboration.
If the CG presents the conflict, most rulings are in favour of that government: in 95% of cases, unanimously. However, there is not much difference from the rulings in favour of the ACs: 36 compared to 40, and 92% unanimously. And there are fewer rulings in favour of the CG than those in favour of the ACs or both administrations: 40 compared to 50.
If an AC presents the conflict, most rulings are also in favour of the CG: in 79% of cases, unanimously. Here there is a marked difference from the rulings in favour of the ACs: 46 compared to 114, although there are more unanimous judgements: 93%. It appears that when the regions present a conflict, it is clearer for the TC when they are right, than when the CG or both governments are. There are also fewer rulings in favour of CG than to the ACs or both administrations: 114 compared to 147.
The cases in which conflicts brought by each administration are accrued are not statistically important. But the ones where the ruling is in favour of both governments are important, which happens more when the ACs brought the conflict.
In total, 89% of the conflicts presented by the CG are resolved unanimously. For conflicts presented by the ACs, it is 78%.
Conflicts ruled in favour of the CG are resolved unanimously in 83% of the cases. For conflicts in favour of the ACs, it is 93%. 81% of all conflicts are resolved unanimously. Without a more rigorous analysis, these results could be interpreted as supporting the legalist behaviour as well as the realist on the part of the TC. In general, the conflicts brought by the CG are more likely to be ruled in its favour, and almost always unanimously. Those brought by the regions are also mostly ruled in favour of the CG (and also, many are in favour of both levels of government). Does this mean the TC is predisposed to support the positions of the CG (in accordance with the realist hypothesis) or that the CG does bring cases with more legal basis than the regions (according to the legalist hypothesis)? In the following sections we will try to give an econometric answer to this question.
Specifications
Our goal is to determine empirically whether the behaviour of the TC in the resolution of positive conflicts of competence between the CG and the ACs is better explained by legal or political criteria. If the realist viewpoint dominates, as the TC is a body whose members are appointed by central institutions, we would expect a predisposition of the Court to rule in favour of the CG. The differences within the TC, if any, would appear when the party in national government is different to the party governing the AC.
To reach our goal, we have specified and estimated three probit/logit models in turn, in which we construct the dependent variable differently each time, according to whether the ruling of the TC favours the CG exclusively or even partially. The three endogenous variables are as follows:
1. FAVCG1: A dichotomous variable which takes the value 1 if the TC rules in favour of the CG, in all or part of the claim, and 0 if not.
FAVCG2:
A dichotomous variable which takes the value 1 if the TC rules totally in favour of the CG, and 0 if it rules partly or totally in favour of the AC.
FAVECG3:
A discrete variable which takes three values: 0, if the ruling is in favour of the AC; 1, if it favours both governments; and 2, if it is in favour of the CG.
The choice of the independent variables and the interpretation of their sign are particularly difficult. Let us suppose that we construct-as indeed we do -a variable which takes the value 1 if the conflict is brought by the CG and is resolved unanimously, and zero otherwise. A positive sign in the estimated coefficient of this variable does not let us discern whether the TC is behaving according to the realist or the legalist approach. It might mean that the judges of the Court support the CG for political reasons, or because its side of the conflict is legally correct.
However, the interpretation of a negative sign is clearer. If the fact that the TC unanimously resolves a conflict presented by the CG reduces the probability that the ruling is favourable to this government, this result means we cannot accept the hypothesis that the behaviour of the TC corresponds to the realist viewpoint. Or to put it another way, we cannot reject the legalist hypothesis.
With this word of caution, we present below all the exogenous variables we have constructed. It was not possible to know how each judge voted in each ruling; only when they cast a particular opinion. In the fifth section, we explain the variables that have been included in the final specifications. All the signs correspond to the legalism hypothesis:
 PRESCG: A variable that takes the value 1 if the CG presents the conflict alone, and 0 otherwise. If the CG presenting the conflict reduces the probability of a ruling in its favour, we cannot reject the legalism hypothesis: negative sign (-).
 UNAN: A variable which takes the value 1 if the conflict is resolved unanimously, and 0 otherwise. If the fact the conflict was resolved unanimously reduces the probability of the ruling being favourable to CG, this means we cannot reject the legalist behaviour of the Court (-).
 PRESCG*UNAN: A variable resulting from the interaction of the previous two variables (-).
 DIFF*UNAN: A variable resulting from the interaction of DIFF and UNAN, the former being a variable which takes the value 1 if the conflict affects an AC with a different ideology than the CG at the time of the ruling, and 0 otherwise. If the probability of ruling in favour of the CG is reduced when a conflict is presented by or against an AC of a different party than the CG, and it is resolved unanimously by judges with a different ideology, the formalism hypothesis cannot be rejected (-). o REFFIN*: Reforms of the regional financing system. We have constructed five dummies (REFFIN1 to REFFIN5), which take the value of 1 during the three years before the approval of the successive reforms of the regional financing system (passed, respectively, on 7 November 1986 , 20 January 1992 , 23 September 1996 July 2001 and 15 June 2009), and 0 otherwise. We assume that regional financial reforms would have a dampening effect on the demands of the ACs and their conflicts with the CG, but this effect would be expected to weaken over time.
Consequently, if in the years before a new reform the TC ruled more against the CG, the legalism hypothesis cannot be rejected (-).
Estimation and results
First, we performed an analysis of the correlation between the variables described above. These correlations are shown in Table 3 . As can be seen in the table, the correlation between some of the explanatory variables is high enough for us not to accept the complete list in the specification of the different models. Our criterion for selection was to eliminate one of the two presenting a positive or negative correlation with an absolute value over 0.5. The descriptive statistics of the selected variables are shown in table 4.
[ Thus, for each of the three proposed endogenous variables, the initial specification was as follows: Where FAVCGX represents, alternatively, each of the three selected endogenous variables:
FAVCG1, FAVCG2 and FAVCG3. Since these three variables are discrete, we opted to estimate [1] using probit/logit models, selecting the model with the highest value of the loglikelihood function. Also, the hierarchical nature of the values of FAVCG3 recommends the use of an ordered probit/logit model for estimate this variable. Subindex i corresponds to each ruling resolving a conflict of competence.
The estimations with each of the three endogenous variables, are presented in Tables 5   (FAVCG1 and FAVCG2 ) and 6 (FAVCG3). Together with the estimated value of the coefficient, the value of the marginal effects is offered in case the explanatory variable proves to be significant.
For each endogenous variable, we also present an estimation corresponding to a much more stylized model, resulting from a process in which the variables least satisfactory in terms of significance are successively pulled out of the specification described in [1] . We identify these estimations in Tables 5 and 6 
as FAVCG1(2), FAVCG(2) and FAVCG 3(2).
[ Simplified models have lower values in the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria than complete models. Therefore, we will describe the results achieved focusing exclusively on these abbreviated models. In the estimation of the variable FAVCG1, where the value 1 shows rulings totally or partly favourable to the CG, there are three variables which are found to be significant, with the negative sign supporting the hypothesis of legalism: PRESCG, DIFF*UNAN and CONFL12. So if the conflict is brought by the CG (unlike the results obtained by Sala, 2011 and Dalla Peregrina and , the ruling is unanimous and affects an AC with a political colour other than that of the CG, or is issued before the approval of the autonomic pacts of 1992, this reduces the probability of the ruling being at least partly favourable to the CG.
If the conflict is against the Basque Country (AGAINSTBC), this increases the probability that the ruling favours the CG (with a level of significance very close to 10%). As we remarked above while explaining the construction of the independent variables, this positive sign does not let us conclude whether the TC is guided more by political or legal criteria. The most we can say is that this result does not support unambiguously the legalism hypothesis.
Regarding the estimation of the variable FAVCG2, which takes the value 1 only for rulings that are strictly favourable to the CG (but not, therefore, to those that say both sides are right), three significant variables have the sign associated with the legalist viewpoint: the conflict was presented by Catalonia (PRESCAT) or was resolved in the period of conflict between the CG and the ACs which began at the turn of the century (CONFL22) or the years before the 2001 reform of the regional financing system (REFFIN4). The same negative sign favouring the formalist hypothesis (although again with a significance slightly over 10%) has the variable that reflects whether the conflicts are instigated against the Autonomous Community of Catalonia (AGAINSTCAT).
In the last estimation, the dependent variable is FAVCG3, which as we explain above, takes the value 0 if the ruling is in favour of the AC; 1, if it favours both governments; and 2, if it is in favour of the CG. In this estimation the significant variables, with the sign associated with the legalist hypothesis, are PRESCG, PRESCAT, CONFL12 and REFFIN4, the last two with significance a little over 10%. With the same caution regarding the level of confidence, the variable CGMIN is also significant, but with a negative sign that does not allow us to support the legalism hypothesis.
Concluding remarks
This paper applies various probit/logit models to a self-constructed database, consisting of the 365 rulings by the Spanish Constitutional Court resolving positive conflicts of competence between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities from 1981 to 2014. Our goal was to contrast empirically whether the decisions of the Court basically respond to legal criteria (the legalist or formalist viewpoint) or if they are determined by political motivations, so that we can state that the TC constitutes an extension, in the jurisdictional milieu, of the central executive power (the realist viewpoint). According to the results of our three estimations, we can state that the approach which appears to predominate in the behaviour of the TC is the legalist one.
Conflicts of competence represent only a small part of the disputes between the national government and the Autonomous Communities that end up being judged by the TC (Aja, 2014) , and they share some characteristics that should be noted. First, they have a very specific objective: to decide on the ownership or exercise of a competence. Second, as explained in the introduction, conflicts affect regulations, resolutions and acts, but not laws: competence conflicts affecting laws should be treated as acts of unconstitutionality. Although we do not think that these unique features justify differentiated behaviour by the Constitutional Court, we cannot be sure that the results found in this research can be extrapolated to any dispute between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities. Testing this hypothesis constitutes a logical extension of this work. 0, 12 0, 16 0, 17 0, 27 0, 23 0, 86 0, 36 0, 14 1, 00 CRI SI S 0, 10 0, 14 0, 17 0, 28 0, 19 0, 84 0, 35 0, 13 0, 98 1, 18 0, 08 0, 24 0, 25 0, 21 0, 16 0, 15 0, 42 .4425 a The table shows, in the columns, the value of the estimated coefficient of each variable and the marginal effect of the significant variables over the probability that the endogenous variables take the value 1. The results correspond to a probit or logit model, attending to the conventional choice of whichever of the two which presents the greater estimated value of the log-likelihood function. *** Significant coefficient at 1%, ** significant coefficient at 5%, * significant coefficient at 10%. The p-value is also given when the significance is very close to 10%. Table shows , in the columns, the value of the estimated coefficient of each variable and the marginal effect of the significant variables over the probability that the endogenous variable FAVECG3 takes each one of its possible values (0, 1, 2). *** Significant coefficient at 1%, ** significant coefficient at 5%, * significant coefficient at 10%. The p-value is also given when the significance is very close to 10%.
